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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 09-4336 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES EDWARD CLARK, 
Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-08-cr-00508-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, BARRY and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed March 24, 2011)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Defendant James Edward Clark was convicted by a jury of one count of 
attempting to manufacture and possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more 
of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of possession 
of a listed chemical with intent to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 
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21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(1).  Clark had agreed with a confidential informant (“CI”) to 
manufacture and distribute crystal methamphetamine.  Clark supplied the CI with 
what Clark believed to be the necessary chemicals from which the CI, if 
compliant, would have manufactured crystal methamphetamine.  Later, the CI 
arranged for a reverse sting, during which Clark made an exchange with the CI for 
what Clark thought was crystal methamphetamine, but was not.  As a result, Clark 
was sentenced to 360 months on count one, and 240 months on count two, to be 
served concurrently.  On appeal, Clark raises multiple issues relating to his 
suppression motion, his conviction, and his sentence.  We will affirm. 
Suppression of Statements 
 Clark challenges, on two separate bases, the District Court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress statements he made during a custodial interrogation.  Clark 
contends that the Miranda warnings he received were insufficient and, 
alternatively, that there was insufficient evidence for the District Court to find that 
he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.  We exercise plenary 
review over the sufficiency of the warnings.  United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 
1078 (3d Cir. 1990).  We also exercise plenary review over the ultimate question 
of the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, “although we review the historical facts 
supporting that conclusion for clear error.”  United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 
245-46 (3d Cir. 2005).  The Miranda warnings given to Clark were sufficient and 
there was no evidence supporting a lack of voluntariness of his waiver of rights.  
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We find no merit to either of Clark’s contentions, and we affirm the District 
Court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 Clark challenges the District Court’s denial of his motion for a judgment of 
acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence.  We review for plain error 
because Clark failed to renew his motion after he presented his case, and he also 
failed to make a timely motion after the jury returned its verdict.  United States v. 
Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1986).  Clark argues that there is not 
enough evidence to prove he intended to produce methamphetamine because the 
substance he provided to the informant was incapable of being turned into 
methamphetamine.  Impossibility, however, is not a defense to attempt.  United 
States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900, 908 (3d Cir. 1983).  We find no plain error. 
Admission of Other Act Evidence 
 Clark challenges the admission of Rule 404(b) “other act” evidence, which 
revealed that he and the CI had previously participated in a methamphetamine 
cook together, contending that the evidence failed to pass muster under the Rule 
403 balancing test.  We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of 
discretion.  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir.1997).  
The District Court found that the evidence clarified the relationship between Clark 
and the CI, and was relevant to Clark’s intent in dealing with the CI in relation to 
the current charges.  The Court gave appropriate limiting instructions to the jury.  
We find no abuse of discretion. 
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Sentencing 
 Clark levels multiple challenges to the validity of the sentence imposed by 
the District Court.  First, Clark challenges the Court’s authority to make factual 
findings during a sentencing hearing without the aid of a jury; however, because 
the sentence imposed by the Court did not exceed the statutory maximum, the 
Court was free to make factual findings based on a preponderance of the 
evidence.
1
  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 565-66 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
In the alternative, Clark challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the 
Court’s factual findings regarding the obstruction of justice enhancement and the 
drug quantity used in calculating his offense level.  We review Clark’s challenge 
to the finding that he obstructed justice for plain error because he raises it for the 
first time on appeal.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993).  We 
find no plain error.  
 We review Clark’s challenge to the finding of the drug quantity for clear 
error.  United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 322 (3d Cir. 2001).  Where there is 
no drug seizure, the sentencing judge is to approximate the quantity of the 
controlled substance.  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 app. note 12.  Additionally, in a reverse 
sting, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance more accurately 
reflects the scale of the offense .  Id..  Here, the evidence shows that Clark 
received one package represented to be about one pound of methamphetamine, 
                                                 
1
 Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), the statutory maximum sentence Clark can 
receive is life imprisonment.  
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and that Clark then requested and provided “ephedrine” for two additional pounds 
of methamphetamine.  We find no clear error.   
 Finally, Clark challenges his sentence as unreasonable.  We review the 
sentence for both procedural and substantive reasonableness.  United States v. 
Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009).  “[W]e assess unreasonableness under 
the abuse-of-discretion standard.”  Id. at 564.  Here, the District Court correctly 
calculated the Guidelines range, it did not treat the guidelines as mandatory, it 
considered all of the applicable § 3553(a) factors, it did not base the sentence on 
clearly erroneous facts, and it adequately explained the chosen sentence.  It is, 
therefore, a procedurally reasonable sentence.  Additionally, in the totality of the 
circumstances, the imposition of a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range 
was substantively reasonable.  We find that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing this sentence. 
 In light of the above, we will affirm Clark’s convictions and sentence. 
 
